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I.

Introduction

The technologies that we use and the values we embrace construct an
information hungry society. Our mass adoption of them has transformed
many of us into information junkies, and those whose business it is to feed
our info-pangs continuously demand quid pro quo: in order to get
information, you must give some up.
Obviously, there are serious social consequences resulting from the
information trade. It would not be unreasonable, therefore, to expect that
informational privacy might attain value in this century similar to that of
liberty in previous centuries. To some extent, this expectation is realized:
our ability to determine for ourselves when, how, and to what extent
information about us is communicated to others1 has become globally
recognized as an important aspect of personal liberty and selfdetermination.2 Unfortunately, these global pronouncements are not yet well
understood by the general public at the domestic level.
In Canada, the increased need for informational privacy has been directly
linked to our rapid adoption of information technology. Here is how Bruce
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See, for example, Alan F. Westin, Privacy and Freedom (New York, Atheneum, 1970) at 322.
2
Privacy has historically been conceptualized as a right and has been linked with notions of dignity and
autonomy. In 1948, for instance, the United Nations included privacy protections as Article 12 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights. See <http://www.un.org/Overview/rights.html>. Similarly, Article
17 of the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights refers to privacy. See
<http://www.hrweb.org/legal/cpr.html>. Specific data protection regimes include: the Council of Europe's
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with Regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data
(<http://conventions.coe.int/treaty/EN/cadreprincipal.htm>); the OECD Guidelines on the Protection of
Privacy and Transborder Flows of Personal Data
(<http://www.oecd.org/document/18/0,2340,en_2649_34255_1815186_1_1_1_1,00.html>); and Directive
95/46 of the European Parliament (<http://www.cdt.org/privacy/eudirective/EU_Directive_.html>).

Phillips, former Privacy Commissioner of Canada, described the advent of
PIPEDA,3 Canada’s private sector privacy law, a few years ago:
This statute, which came into effect on 1 January 2001,
constitutes the first determined effort to place a check upon,
and ultimately to reverse, the massive erosion of individual
privacy rights brought about by the application of computer and
communications technology in the commercial world.4
To understand what PIPEDA aims to achieve, the Act is perhaps best
understood from a technosocial viewpoint. Rather than viewing computer and
communications technologies as mere instruments or things, one must
understand such technologies as situated in the organizational, informational
and human contexts that are required for their functioning.5 Although PIPEDA
is often thought of as little more than a set of rules and regulations for dataminers and digital marketers, in fact, its architecture reflects its much
broader technosocial underpinnings. Viewed through a technosocial lens,
PIPEDA is not simply about harnessing the speed of transmission, the
massive storage capabilities, or the broad reach of networked computers.
Instead, PIPEDA attempts to achieve a very delicate and complicated balance
between the organizational, informational, economic and individual interests
that are embedded within the broad social adoption of information
technology.
In privacy law, consent is the nexus; it is the interface between human
beings and our increasingly automated information gathering and
dissemination tools. Consent acts as a kind of guardian of personal
information. Except where it is unreasonable to require or otherwise
inappropriate to obtain,6 the knowledge and consent of an individual are
required for the collection, use, or disclosure of her personal information.7
Recognizing this, the current Privacy Commissioner of Canada, Jennifer
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Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, S.C. 2000, c.5 (hereafter PIPEDA).
Bruce Phillips, “Foreword” in Stephanie Perrin, Heather H. Black, David H. Flaherty and T. Murray
Rankin, The Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act: An Annotated Guide (2001,
Toronto, Irwin) at ix.
5
See, for example, Saskia Everts, Gender & Technology: Empowering Women, Engendering Development
(London, Zed Books, 1998) at 5 and Anne Scott, "Grounded Politics: Some Thoughts on Feminist Process
in the Information Age", ACM Computers & Society vol 31, no. 4 (December 2001) pp 5-14.
6
PIPEDA, supra footnote 3. Principle 4.3 contains a note which purports to define some situations where
consent may be inappropriate, but PIPEDA section 2(2) explicitly excludes the Note. Instead, section 7 of
PIPEDA sets out the only circumstances in which consent will be inappropriate. This model has been
recognized at the Federal Court level in Eastmond v. Canadian Pacific Railway 2004 FC 852 where Justice
Lemieux wrote at paragraph 186 that: “subsection 7(1) of the Act has given content to the words “except
where inappropriate” found in 4.3 of the Schedule”.
7
PIPEDA, supra footnote 3, Principle 4.3.
4

Stoddart, has described consent as “the fundamental principle on which
PIPEDA is based.”8
In this article, we investigate PIPEDA’s conception of consent, with special
emphasis on the right of individuals to withdraw consent. Not only do PIPEDA
and similar data protection laws around the globe require consent prior to the
collection, use, or disclosure of most personal information, we suggest that
they set higher thresholds for obtaining consent than would be afforded by
way of private ordering.9 Unlike the law of contracts – where consent is seen
as a single transactional moment – PIPEDA generally allows the information
subject to withdraw consent at any time.10 On this basis, we argue that
PIPEDA’s consent model is best understood as providing an ongoing act of
agency to the information subject. This notion, we suggest, is much more
robust than the usual model for consent in private ordering, which treats
consent as an isolated moment of contractual agreement during an
information exchange.
Although consent-as-ongoing-agency is a promising antidote to the “erosion
of individual privacy rights brought about by the application of computer and
communications technology in the commercial world,”11 an investigation of
various psychological factors surrounding the decision whether to withdraw
consent reveals that the full potential of this model may be compromised in
practice. This unfortunate fact is made plain through an analysis of the
psychological barriers to withdrawing consent. Our descriptive account of
these psychological barriers also helps to explain why people who say that
they value their privacy often appear to act otherwise.
Instead of viewing consent in isolation (and, accordingly, viewing these
psychological considerations as stumbling blocks), PIPEDA may be read as
providing a framework which aims to build a culture that better understands
the importance of privacy protection. In so doing, the power of the
psychological factors may be addressed and the significance of consenting
and/or withdrawing consent to the collection, use and disclosure of personal
information made meaningful again.
II.

8

Contractual versus Ongoing Consent

Jennifer Stoddart, "An Overview of Canada’s New Private Sector Privacy Law – The Personal
Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act" (available at
<http://www.privcom.gc.ca/speech/2004/vs/vs_sp-d_040331_e.asp>).
9
See Ian Kerr, "If Left to their Own Devices" in Michael Geist, ed., In the Public Interest: The Future of
Canadian Copyright Law (Toronto, Irwin Law, 2005) and Ian Kerr, "Hacking at Privacy" in Michael Geist,
ed., Privacy Law Review (Toronto, Butterworths, 2005).
10
“An individual may withdraw consent at any time, subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable
notice.” PIPEDA section 4.3.8 of Schedule 1.
11
Phillips, supra, footnote 4.

Although the collection, use, and disclosure of personal information pursuant
to PIPEDA generally requires “knowledge and consent”,12 the notion of
consent is nowhere defined in the Act. In its broader common law context,
consent is often characterized as “freely given agreement.”13 More
specifically, consent is described as:
…voluntary agreement by a person in the possession and
exercise of sufficient mental capacity to make an intelligent
choice to do something proposed by another. It supposes a
physical power to act, a moral power of acting, and a serious,
determined, and free use of these powers. Consent is implied in
every agreement. It is an act unclouded by fraud, duress, or
sometimes even mistake.14
Because the “voluntary agreement” aspect is so central, consent is often
linked to the legal paradigm of contract. The notion of an agreement –
contractual or otherwise – usually presupposes some particular aim or
object. One never agrees in a vacuum; rather one agrees to something, or
with something. In private law, certainly in contract law, consent is
understood as inherently transactional – a definable moment that occurs
when the parties crystallize the terms and conditions upon which they agree.
Contractual consent is determined at the moment the parties communicate
their intention to be bound by that agreement.15 Whether executed or
executory,16 contractual consent is expressed in an instant. Once the parties
have achieved a consensus, the contract is in place and the obligations
become fixed. As of the moment this happens, the question of contractual
consent is settled.
By contrast, the consent requirement set out in PIPEDA is not an
isolated moment of agreement. Consent in PIPEDA is conceived of as
somehow ongoing.
Of course, the notion of ongoing consent is not unique to privacy. Other
areas of law – consent to treatment in health law, for example – regard
consent as an ongoing process:
To many in the care-giving professions, consent is nothing more
than obtaining a patient’s signature on a “consent” form. Such
12

Supra, footnote 6. See also section 7 of the Act.
Dukelow, Daphne A. and Betsy Nuse, The Dictionary of Canadian Law, 2nd ed. (Scarborough, Ont,
Carswell, 1995) at 232.
14
Henry Campbell Black, Michael J. Connolly and Joseph R. Nolan, eds., Black’s Law Dictionary, 5th ed.,
(St. Paul, Minnesota, West Group Publishing, 1979) at 276.
15
Gerald H. L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 4th ed. (Scarborough, ON, Carswell, 1999) at
16-17 and Stephen Waddams, The Law of Contracts, 4th ed. (Toronto, Emond Montgomery
Publications, 1999) at 66-67.
16
An executory contract is one which has not yet been completely fulfilled by one or more of the parties:
Gerald H. L. Fridman, The Law of Contract in Canada, 3rd ed. (Scarborough, ON, Carswell, 1994) at 108.
13

an impression belies the fact that consent is a “process” which
involves a treatment relationship and effective communication
over a period of time. The fact that some provincial legislation
or regulations require signed written “consents” to treatment
does not change this fact. … [T]he signed consent form is
nothing more than evidence of consent. It is not the consent
itself.17
There are a number of similarities in the consent-seeking-processes in health
law and privacy law. Both regimes require that the person consenting have
the mental capacity and be legally competent to consent.18 Both require that
the organization seeking consent provide adequate disclosure of the relevant
information needed by the person choosing whether to consent.19 Both
regimes strictly limit the scope of consent to the specified purpose or
procedure.20 Both provide the person consenting with the opportunity to ask
(and receive understandable answers to) questions concerning that to which
they are consenting.21
While the two systems share these basic requirements as core
elements of the consent seeking process,22 there is also an important
difference between the two. Consent to treatment in a medical
context is inherently specific, usually relating to a particular procedure
or set of procedures. By contrast, consent under PIPEDA often has
implications and effects which extend well beyond a specific
transaction or series of transactions.23
III.

Consent as an Act of Ongoing Agency

To understand and appreciate the ongoing consent doctrine, one must
recognize PIPEDA as predicated on the notion that individuals have a
right to control personal information about themselves. If individuals
have such a right-of-control then, unless they surrender it,24 they
retain ultimate control over their personal information in spite of
17

Lorne Rozovsky, The Canadian Law of Consent to Treatment, 2d ed. (Markham, Butterworths, 1997) at

1.
18

Ibid at 3.
Ibid.
20
Ibid.
21
Ibid.
22
Some of which will not always be resolved during the first instance of consent.
23
It is interesting to note that Canadian medical consent law does contain an exception which makes it
possible for a physician to extend surgery beyond the procedure authorized by the patient (Rozovsky,
supra, footnote 17 at 17). This is analogous to the “consistent use” provisions of Canada’s Privacy Act
(R.S. 1985, c. P-21) as recognized in sections 9 and 11. In contrast, the drafters of PIPEDA have not
included such a clause, making “consistent use” inapplicable under PIPEDA.
24
A question arises as to whether this right is alienable. See, for example, James Rule and Lawrence
Hunter "Towards Property Rights in Personal Data" in Colin J. Bennett and Rebecca Grant, eds., Visions of
Privacy: Policy Choices for the Digital Age (Toronto, University of Toronto Press, 1999).
19

consenting to its use by some organization. The consent afforded to an
organization to use an individual’s personal information must therefore
be understood to be restricted. Consent does not give the organization
ultimate control over personal information in perpetuity.
In other words, the continued use of an individual’s personal
information must be understood as a necessary consequence, not of
the initial consent to collect the information, but rather of that person’s
continuing consent to the organization to use that information.
Consent, for the purposes of PIPEDA, must not be thought as a
“release” of information, nor as a complete “assignment” of control
over the information. Rather, it is a “license” that permits some limited
collection, use or disclosure.25
Principle 4.5 also deals with the issue of retention.26 The fact that an
organization cannot retain indefinitely is further indication of a limited
consent, one which is linked to specific purposes.
Taken altogether, this strongly suggests that information is not
unilaterally released when consent is given, but rather that an
individual has ongoing agency in managing her personal information.
This ongoing right of control held by the individual is reinforced in law
by the corollary requirement of ongoing consent, which is codified in
Principle 4.3.8 of PIPEDA. This Principle permits individuals to
withdraw consent at any time.27 This provision, in conjunction with a
number of others mentioned above,28 is meant to place the individual
in control of her personal information at all times, signaling that
consent, in the privacy law context, is an ongoing act of agency.
PIPEDA’s framework sets up support for this contention, especially in
the Schedule 1 Principles. Organizations are to be open about their
information management practices29, presumably in order that
individuals are able to make informed initial decisions and revisit those
decisions when and if necessary.

25

Under PIPEDA Principle 4.2.2, consent is only given for the purposes specified.
Under Principle 4.4 these purposes must be appropriately limited, and under Principle 4.5
all uses or disclosures require consent and should be documented per Principle 4.5.1.
Almost any new purpose beyond those already specified requires new consent, as set out
in Principle 4.2.4.
26
PIPEDA Principle 4.5.3 states that personal information that is no longer required to fulfill the identified
purposes should not be retained, and requires organizations to develop guidelines and implement
procedures to govern the destruction of personal information.
27
Subject to legal or contractual restrictions and reasonable notice.
28
Supra, footnote 25.
29
PIPEDA Principle 4.8.

The ability to withdraw consent is only one of the possible responses
open to an individual as she manages her personal information individuals have a right of access to their personal information30 and a
corresponding right to challenge the accuracy or completeness of that
information.
Finally, individuals have the power to challenge an organization’s
compliance with the requirements of PIPEDA,31 both via a complaint to
the Privacy Commissioner32 and, if necessary, by proceeding to Federal
Court after the Privacy Commisisoner releases a report of her findings
in the matter.33
IV.

Psychological Barriers to Withdrawing Consent

In response to the claim that individuals have a right to determine for
themselves when, how, and to what extent personal information is
communicated to others, a number of critics have complained that most
people don’t seem to care all that much about this right.34 These critics say
that when you look at how people behave, it seems that many if not most do
not truly value the right to control their personal information. People seem
willing to hand over their personal information in exchange for benefits as
trivial as the possibility of winning a toaster, and few ever exercise the right
to withdraw consent to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal
information.35
This behaviour is inconsistent with expressed privacy values36 and there is
value in exploring whether and why people rarely exercise their right to
withdraw consent to the collection, use, and disclosure. Such an
investigation, thus far absent in the Canadian privacy law and policy
literature, is important because a systemic failure to exercise the right to
withdraw consent reduces the consent principle to little more than the
transactional moment of private ordering, rendering PIPEDA’s new, robust,
ongoing consent practically worthless. Ongoing consent requires the exercise
of agency in granting, modifying, reconsidering and withdrawing consent in
response to changing circumstances.

30

PIPEDA Principle 4.9. and section 8 of the Act.
PIPEDA Principle 4.10.
32
PIPEDA Section 12.
33
PIPEDA Section 14.
34
Acquisti, A. and Grossklags, J. (2004). "Privacy attitudes and privacy behavior", in J. Camp and S.R.
Lewis, eds., The Economics of Information Security: Advances in Information Security, Volume 12, 65178, (Norwell, Massachussets, Kluwer, 2004)..
35
As Oracle C.E.O. Larry Ellison famously said, “Well, this privacy you're concerned about is largely an
illusion. All you have to give up is your illusions, not any of your privacy.” (Interview with anchor Hank
Plante of KPIX-TV, a San Francisco TV station, on September 21, 2001.)
36
See for example Ekos Research Associates Privacy Revealed: The Canadian Privacy Survey(1993)
(Ottawa, Ontario) 10.
31

So, why do people who have consented to an organization’s demand for
personal information generally refuse to review, revise or withdraw their
consent? Let’s consider a typical example involving a hypothetical individual
named Jij.
Recently, Jij visited the Toronto Star website to read an article recommended
by a friend. From the title, it appeared that the article was interesting and
relevant, and the website offered immediate and “free” access – with one
catch: in order to read the article, Jij had to register as a user. By
registering, Jij permitted the Toronto Star to collect and use a variety of
personal information. Jij knows this but, in the moment, her desire to read
the article outweighed her concern about information privacy, so she
completed the registration process and thus agreed to the collection and use
of her personal information without even trying to understand the
implications of doing so. Having a basic understanding of privacy law, Jij did
so knowing that she could, at any time, withdraw her consent.
But will she?
Much will depend on a number of psychological factors that influence the way
that Jij makes a decision about whether to withdraw consent. Our analysis
suggests that these factors work in concert, resulting in a circumstance
already well-known to marketers: namely, that consent, once given, is
unlikely to be withdrawn.37
Jij likes to think of herself as a consistent person, someone who makes
careful and considered decisions that take into account her values and
preferences. Yet Jij just acted in a way that is inconsistent with her own
values -- she has freely consented to a sweeping collection and use of
personal information in return for a relatively small reward. She is not alone
in this either. According to a recent PEW survey, 60% of all Americans are
“very concerned” about privacy, while at the same time 54% have shared
personal information in order to get access to a Web site, and an additional
10% are willing to provide this information if asked.38 Thus, at least one
quarter of those surveyed have acted or are prepared to act with
inconsistency similar to Jij’s, releasing personal information for relatively
small or nonexistent rewards seemingly despite significant concerns about
their own privacy.

37

Opt-out protocols (where consent is assumed unless explicitly withdrawn) lead to greater rates of consent
than do opt-in protocols (where the default is no consent). See E. J. Johnson, S. Bellman, and G. L. Lohse
"Defaults, Framing, and Privacy: Why Opting in ≠ Opting Out, (2002), Marketing Letters, 13(1), 5-15.
38
S. Fox, L. Rainie, J. Horrigan, A. Lenhart, T. Spooner and C. Carter, "Trust and privacy online: Why
Americans want to rewrite the rules" (2000), The PEW Internet and American Life Project, available at
<http://www.pewinternet.org/pdfs/PIP_Trust_Privacy_Report.pdf>.

Such inconsistency can be uncomfortable, and psychologists have a name for
this discomfort: cognitive dissonance.39 According to the theory of cognitive
dissonance, inconsistent beliefs or beliefs that are inconsistent with actions
can give rise to an uncomfortable psychological state. The above example
has all the hallmarks of a situation that will trigger cognitive dissonance40: (i)
Jij feels personally responsible for her own decision to consent and thus
cannot blame her actions on someone or something else; (ii) Jij understands
that, as a direct result of her decision, her privacy, which is something she
values, has been compromised; (iii) the justification for her decision is
relatively weak, since she could, with relatively little effort, have accessed
the article through other means; and (iv) she has clearly made a free choice
to release her personal information.41
Psychological research has demonstrated that people tend to resolve
cognitive dissonance through one of three mechanisms.42 One possibility is to
trivialize some of the competing cognitions.43 In the current situation, this
could translate into Jij convincing herself either that the privacy violation in
this case is not important, or that privacy itself is overvalued.
Another possibility is to seek selectively information consistent with her
decision. In the realm of consumption, this translates into selective attention
to positive product information regarding a chosen alternative.44 In this case,
Jij could seek and attend to information suggesting that the collection and
use of personal information by the Toronto Star does not constitute a privacy
violation, since the Toronto Star has a privacy policy and therefore must be
privacy compliant.45
The third mode of dissonance reduction is change of attitude, opinion, or
behaviour.46 Jij could, for example, modify her attitude about information
privacy so that she considers privacy to be less important, or she could

39

See L. Festinger, A theory of cognitive dissonance (Palo Alto, CA, Stanford University Press, 1957) and
L. Festinger, Conflict, decision, and dissonance (Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press, 1964).
40
J. Cooper and R. H. Fazio, "A new look at dissonance" (2004), Advances in experimental social
psychology 17, at pp. 227-266.
41
E. Harmon-Jones, J. W. Brehm, J. Greenberg, L. Simon and D. E. Nelson, "Evidence that the production
of aversive consequences is not necessary to create cognitive dissonance" (1996), Journal of Personality
and Social Psychology 70(1), pp. 5-16.
42
J. W. Brehm and A.R. Cohen, Explorations in Cognitive Dissonance (New York, Wiley, 1962). See also
Festinger supra, footnote 39.
43
L. Simon, J.Greenberg and J. Brehm, "Trivialization: The forgotten mode of dissonance reduction"
(1995), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68, pp. 247-260.
44
D. Ehrlich, I. Guttman, P. Schonbach and J. Mills, "Postdecision exposure to relevant information"
(1951), Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology 54, pp. 98-102.
45
Jacquelyn Burkell and Valerie Steeves, "Privacy Policies on Kids’ Favourite Web Sites", Presented at the
6th Annual Privacy and Security Workshop, Privacy and Security: Disclosure, University of Toronto on
November 3, 2005. available at <http://idtrail.org/content/blogcategory/21/72/>.
46
A. Elliot and P. Devine, "On the motivational nature of cognitive dissonance as psychological
discomfort" (1994), Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 67, pp. 382-394.

perhaps place less value on her privacy with regard to the particular
information that she has disclosed to the Toronto Star.
Each of these resolutions would address Jij’s current state of psychological
discomfort; at the same time, however, each reduces the likelihood that Jij
will later withdraw her consent. In fact, once she has successfully resolved
the dissonance there is little reason for her to go back and revisit her original
consent: after all, she now perceives that decision as consistent with the only
value that would lead her to revoke it (that is, her valuing of privacy). This is
not to say that she couldn’t withdraw her consent. She could. However, the
principle of cognitive dissonance suggests that she may not be motivated to
do so.
There are other aspects of the situation that could have the same effect;
aspects that will tend to bias decisions against withdrawing consent. These
arise from what is, essentially, a re-weighting of the gains and losses
associated with consent. This re-weighting occurs once the initial decision
has been made, and arises as a direct result of the decision itself.
Typically, an individual considering initial consent is weighing the subjective
value of an immediate gain (e.g., of access to the Toronto Star), against the
subjective value of a less salient loss of control over personal information,
with ramifications that, though significant, are less immediate. In contrast,
withdrawing consent typically results in an immediate loss (e.g., the loss of
access to the Toronto Star), and the gain of the relatively distant, ephemeral,
and potentially partially illusory benefit of control over her personal
information.47
In addition to bringing to an end the permission given to an organization to
collect, use, or disclose personal information, sometimes the practical effect
of withdrawing consent is to reverse the benefits and burdens that coincided
with the conferral of the original consent: much of what is lost in consent is
gained in withdrawal, as is much of what is gained in consent lost in
withdrawal.48 There are, however, at least two reasons to think that the
relative value of these gains and losses will change after an initial decision to
consent: specifically, that the subjective value of consent will actually
become greater once the initial consent has been offered.
First, according to prospect theory49, decisions are made in a context where
losses loom larger than gains, and where outcomes are evaluated against an
47

The benefit could be partially illusory if her information has already been provided, with consent, to a
third party.
48
Strictly speaking, this is not always the case. To continue our example from above, Jij may have read a
number of articles in exchange for consent to collect, use, or disclose her personal information. Upon her
withdrawal of consent, she will likely lose the ability to access articles in the future. But removing access
does not put her back in her initial situation since that will not undo what she has already read.
49
D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, "Prospect theory: An analysis of decision under risk" (1979),
Econometrica, 47(2), pp. 263-291.

anchor point, or implicit comparator. If the decision under consideration is
whether to offer consent in the first place, the most salient effect is a gain:
right now Jij doesn’t have access to the information she wants, and by
consenting she would gain that access. By contrast, if her decision were to
withdraw consent, it is likely that the most salient outcome is a loss: loss of
access to information. Prospect theory states that losses are weighted more
heavily in decision making than are gains. By extension, the negative value
of loss of access when consent is withdrawn would be greater than the
positive value of access gained when consent is offered. In the literature on
decision making, this has also been called the endowment effect, and is
reflected in the tendency to value an object more when one owns it.50
It is also important to consider when (and to some extent, whether) Jij
experiences the benefits and losses associated with her decisions about
consent. When making her initial decision, Jij is in some sense weighing an
immediate benefit (being able to read the article) against a loss of
information privacy whose effects are at some remove, both temporally and
in terms of overall salience. In contrast, a decision to withdraw consent
involves a comparison between an immediate loss (the loss of access) and a
distant and ephemeral benefit (the benefit of regaining control of her
information). It is well known in decision theory51 that subjective utility –
that is, the personal value of an outcome – changes depending on when the
outcome will be experienced. In particular, the subjective value of a benefit
or loss that Jij receives today is greater than the current subjective value of
that same benefit or loss if it is to be received some time in the future. While
the exact form of this discounting function is subject of much debate,52 the
existence of discounting is universally accepted.
The literature on decision making also suggests that discounts are generally
greater for gains than for losses.53 Thus, both gains and losses lose value as
they are moved into the future: gains are perceived as less “good” and losses
less “bad” – but the rate of change is faster for gains than for losses. When
Jij considers the decision to withdraw consent, the loss (of access to the
articles she wishes to read) is immediate; the gain, however, is not. To the
extent that she sees the gain as something that will be realized in the future,
its value is reduced – and the effect is all the greater because it is a gain that
is distant in time, rather than a loss.
What are the implications of prospect theory and discounted utility for
decisions regarding the withdrawal of consent? Suppose that the initial
50

Daniel Kahneman, Jack L. Knetsch and Richard H. Thaler, "Experimental Tests of the Endowment
Effect and the Coase Theorem" (1990), Journal of Political Economy, 98(6), pp. 1325-48.
51
G.F. Loewenstein and J. Elster, Choice over time (New York, Russell Sage Foundation, 1992).
52
U. Benzion, Y. Schachmurove and J. Yagil, "Subjective discount functions: An experimental approach"
(2004), Applied Financial Economics 14(5), 299-311.
53
See for example M. Ortendahl and J. F. Fries, "Time-related issues with application to health gains and
losses" (2002), Journal of Clinical Epidemiology, 55, pp. 843-848, and R. H. Thaler, "Some empirical
evidence on dynamic inconsistency" (1981), Economic Letters, 8, pp. 201-207.

decision to grant consent was a difficult one, because at that point the
balance of gains and losses only weakly supported Jij’s decision. If nothing
else in the situation has changed, how does that initial consent change the
balance of gains and losses? Initially, the gain was most salient and
immediate, and the loss less salient and only to be experienced in the future.
Now, however, the opposite holds. Given that losses weigh more heavily than
gains, and given that gains are discounted at a greater rate than losses, all
else being equal, the value associated with the withdrawal of consent will
actually be greater than the subjective value of the initial consent. What is
the result? Jij anticipates that if she withdraws her consent, she will actually
feel worse off than she did before she offered it in the first place. Once again,
the psychological factors at play make it less likely that Jij will withdraw
consent.
Cognitive dissonance, prospect theory, and discounted subjective utility have
been shown to apply to decision making in a wide variety of contexts.54
Together, these theories predict a variety of decision biases, including a
normatively irrational preference for the status quo55 and the sunk cost
effect.56 The application of the relevant theories to the doctrine of ongoing
consent is somewhat novel, but the extensions are natural, and there is no
reason to think that these well-established decision biases are inapplicable to
decisions about withdrawing consent.
Acquisti and Grossklags have argued that “we need to incorporate more
accurate models of users’ behavior into the formulation of both policy and
technology”.57 We share this point of view. The psychological theories
discussed above have obvious relevance for the principle of ongoing consent,
and suggest important policy considerations that should be taken into
account in the development and implementation of this doctrine.
The implications for ongoing consent are clear: the decision biases described
above will each tend to reduce the likelihood that consent, once offered, will
be withdrawn. This discussion throws into sharp belief what is perhaps the
most critical point. It is difficult to disabuse decision makers of the biases
and heuristics that influence decision making. Consequently, one cannot
expect that individuals who are not properly educated about the implications
of consenting to the collection, use, or disclosure of personal information will
recognize let alone remedy their tendency to “stick with” an initial consent.
V.
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C. Camerer, “Prospect Theory in the Wild”, in D. Kahneman and A. Tversky, eds., Choices, Values and
Frames (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2000) at pp. 288-300.
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Reflected in the endowment effect as described above.
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A tendency to ‘throw good money after bad’, pursuing a course of action even if it appears that the
investment is not going to pay off.
57
Supra, footnote 34 at 176.

As indicated in the section above, behavioural considerations can be
understood as “barriers” to the meaningful withdrawal of consent. However,
PIPEDA’s new approach to consent strives to accommodate these features of
our psychology within the legislative framework, and to make of them not
stumbling blocks but building blocks.
Consider, for instance, the tendency of individuals to trivialize the value of
privacy in order to reduce their own psychological discomfort that arises from
their consent to the release of private information. PIPEDA has some ability
to respond to this. In fact, the role of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada
was designed (in part) to counter such tendencies. Pursuant to section 24 of
PIPEDA, the Privacy Commissioner has a legal duty to foster public
understanding and valuation of privacy. It is fair to say that this is in fact an
overarching goal of PIPEDA. The legislative schema actually requires the
Commissioner to educate and encourage organizations to develop detailed
privacy policies and practices. It also affords the Office of the Privacy
Commissioner of Canada an educational mandate that goes well beyond the
mere investigation of privacy complaints, promoting the development of a
privacy-valuing and privacy-protecting culture. Among other things, the
current Commissioner has promulgated these aspects of her mandate
through a “contributions program”58 and regular involvement in academic
fora, such as the one that gave rise to this series of published articles. One
of the intended effects of these activities is to encourage a broad
understanding of the importance of privacy.
These activities could be significant, especially when one considers that
individuals often respond to dissonance by diminishing the perceived
importance of a particular privacy violation.59 Where the focus is on the
violation itself, it is easy to understand how the strategy of diminishing the
importance of that violation might act to address dissonance. Recall,
however, that PIPEDA is premised on the more general right of an individual
to control personal information about herself. Given that the cultural and
regulatory focus is predicated on personal autonomy and the importance of
personal control, there is good reason to expect that such a schema, if it
stipulated, promoted and actually enforced higher thresholds for consent,
could have a transformative effect on the manner in which people perceive
the importance of privacy-as-personal-control and consent-as-ongoingagency.60
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Available at <http://www.privcom.gc.ca/information/cp/index_e.asp>.
Consequently, it is suggested that the Privacy Commissioner’s mandate is not merely to educate and
encourage the valuation of privacy but to facilitate a change in the way that people perceive their own
decisions about privacy.
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One could draw parallels here to a suggested approach for the Canadian Human Rights Act (R.S.C. 1985,
c. H-6). In a recent report of the Canadian Human Rights Act Review Panel, the authors recommend that
the language of the Act's purpose clause and of the Act itself be changed in order to emphasize substantive
equality – the notion that its provisions are not merely “special” protections created by the Act but ought
rather to be understood as actualizations of full equality. See
<http://canada.justice.gc.ca/chra/en/chrareview_report_2000.pdf> at p. 11.
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Altering people’s perceptions away from the orientation of marketers might
emasculate the negative effects characterized by prospect theory as well. If
perceived losses loom larger than gains, then it matters a great deal how
people understand the gains and losses that result from exchanges of their
personal information - the manner in which information exchanges are
structured and understood could effectively determine the decisions people
make about initial consent and about whether to withdraw consent.
Rather than the marketers emphasis on “FREE access to” or “FREE
registration for” information products, if, instead, people became focused on
the right to control personal information and the importance of maintaining
that right, the loss of personal control could more easily be perceived as
outweighing the benefits of access to information or services received in
exchange. It might even result in different kinds of bargains. For example, if
people understood the potentially grave implications of surrendering control
over their personal information, as the Privacy Commissioner of Canada has
recently been forced to confront,61 they might actually prefer paying a small
subscription fee for the information product instead of surrendering control of
their personal information; they might rather pay for flights or “gifts” instead
of trading away the right of control over their personal data. There is also a
much greater likelihood that people would more carefully consider what it
means to consent and/or withdraw consent to the collection, use and
disclosure of personal information. Currently, people share a general
impression that consent to the use of personal information is an all-ornothing, take-it-or-leave-it, instantaneous transaction; an offer that they
cannot refuse
In addition to its potential ability to remedy the effects of dissonance and
prospect theory, PIPEDA seeks to assist in addressing the difficulties imposed
by “discounted subjective utility,” i.e., situations where it is perceived that
continued consent tends to trump the subjective value of initial consent.
PIPEDA requires that individuals be made aware of any changes to the
informational situation that gave rise to the initial consent and that unless
the change is required by law, a new consent be received.62 By forcing
organizations to provide notice of collection or to identify new uses of
personal information, individuals receiving such notice are displaced from the
comfort of their initial position and confronted with the decision whether or
not to consent to a secondary use of their personal information. Similarly, by
implementing an ability to withdraw consent at any time, individuals are
provided with the opportunity to become the agents of their own
informational destiny.
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Maclean's magazine recently reported that it was able to purchase the Privacy Commissioner of Canada's
personal phone records from an American data broker. See
<http://www.macleans.ca/topstories/canada/article.jsp?content=20051121_115779_115779>.
62
PIPEDA Principle 4.2.4.

But will the mere fact of these remedial possibilities built-in to PIPEDA
actually ensure that individuals achieve this sort of informational agency? It
is highly unlikely. Our intention here is certainly not to suggest that the mere
enactment of PIPEDA is somehow sufficient to create a new cultural approach
to the issue of consent and its role in informational privacy. Far from it.
That said, it does seem plausible that PIPEDA could be an important first step
toward the development of such a culture. Viewing PIPEDA holistically, we
are struck by the way the Commissioner’s public education mandate maps
onto the philosophical positioning of the individual as the axis of control over
the collection, use and disclosure of personal information. An understanding
of consent as an ongoing act of agency would be consistent with this
approach and would provide a fulcrum for understanding privacy as more
than mere data protection.
Understanding and valuing consent as an ongoing act of agency would
require that organizations, and not just individuals, revise many of their
current practices and policies. Unfortunately, most organizations continue to
treat consent as a transactional moment, using standard form clickwrap
agreements as a means of obtaining overarching “consents” for any/all
potential uses and disclosures of personal information. This archaic, freedomto-contract mentality fails to recognize the higher threshold assigned to
consent in a privacy law context63 and also fails to recognize the role that
consent is meant to play as the nexus between people and information
technology.
VI.

Conclusion

In this article, we have tried to articulate why the transactional approach to
consent is the wrong approach in the privacy context through an examination
of how the psychological barriers to withdrawing consent to the collection,
use, and disclosure of personal information can actually help to inform a
more robust approach to privacy protection in general and to the notion of
consent as an act of ongoing agency in particular. Although there have been
a number of recent complaints about the limitations of PIPEDA64 as a result
of the compromises that were made during its enactment,65 the Act does
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For an articulation of this thesis in the context of consent to the collection of personal information in the
context of digital rights management, see I. Kerr, "If Left to their Own Devices", supra, footnote 9 and I.
Kerr, "Hacking at Privacy", supra, footnote 9.
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Michael Geist, for example, has criticized the ombuds approach to the enforcement of PIPEDA, arguing
that the Privacy Commissioner's inability to issue binding decisions means that there is insufficient
incentive for companies to comply. See
<http://www.thestar.com/NASApp/cs/ContentServer?pagename=thestar/Layout/Article_Type1&c=Article
&cid=1098655810217&call_pageid=971794782442&col=971886476975&DPL=IvsNDS%2f7ChAX&tac
odalogin=yes>. For other examples, see the Canadian Internet Policy and Public Interest Clinic's report on
PIPEDA at <http://www.cippic.ca/en/action-items/pl_article_for_cplr_july_2005.pdf>.
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The recognition of the need for PIPEDA sprung (at least in part) from concern about maintaining and
facilitating Canada’s international trading relationship. It was enacted under the federal trade and

inspire the inculcation of a better understanding of privacy and its
importance in society. As we move towards the statutory review of PIPEDA,66
it is time to start thinking more deeply about what further improvements and
what additional institutions will be required to bring about the vision that
PIPEDA contemplates.

commerce power, and it focuses primarily on commercial activities. The CSA Model Code for the
Protection of Personal Information which forms Schedule 1 of the Act was the result of a process in which
business was intimately involved. See Christopher Berzins, “Protecting Personal Information in Canada’s
Private Sector : The Price of Consensus Building” (2002) 27 Queen’s L.J. 609 at 623 for a discussion of
these tensions.
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To be held early in 2006, five years after its introduction, as required by s.29 of PIPEDA.

